UNI	TED STATES COURT OF AP FOR THE SECOND CIRCUI	
	SUMMARY ORDER	
AND MAY NOT BE CITE OTHER COURT, BUT MA OTHER COURT IN A SUBS	WILL NOT BE PUBLISHED IND AS PRECEDENTIAL AUTOUS Y BE CALLED TO THE ATEQUENT STAGE OF THIS CAUSES OF COLLATERAL ESTO	THORITY TO THIS OR ANY TENTION OF THIS OR ANY SE, IN A RELATED CASE, OI
	United States Court of Appeals for Sees Courthouse, Foley Square, in and six.	
HON. RICHAR HON. PETER V	GTON D. PARKER, D C. WESLEY, V. HALL, Circuit Judges.	
GERSH KORSINSKY,		
Plaintiff-Appellant, -v		SUMMARY ORDER No. 05-6802-cv
U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PRO N.Y.S. DEPARTMENT OF EN PROTECTION, N.Y.C. DEPA ENVIRONMENTAL CONSE	NVIRONMENTAL ARTMENT OF	
Defenda 	nts-Appellees.	
For Plaintiff-Appellant:	Gersh Korsinsky, pro se, I	Brooklyn, New York.
For Defendants-Appellees:	Lawrence H. Fogelman, Assistant United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, New York, NY; Simon Wynn, Assistant Attorney General (Michael Belohlavek, Senior Counsel, Daniel J. Chepaitis, Assistant Solicitor General, <i>on the brief</i> ), Office of the Attorney General, New York, NY; Elizabeth S. Natrella, Senior Counsel, Appeals Division, The City of New York Law	

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, **ADJUDGED AND DECREED** that the judgment of the District Court be and it hereby is

cases or controversies, and, thus, at a minimum, a plaintiff seeking relief in federal court must

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Gersh Korsinsky, pro se, appeals from the district court's judgment dismissing his suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. We assume the parties' familiarity with the factual and

procedural history.

AFFIRMED.

(Naomi Reice Buchwald, Judge).

Article III, § 2 of the United States Constitution limits federal courts to deciding only

"allege, and ultimately prove, that he has suffered an injury-in-fact that is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant, and which is likely to be redressed by the requested relief."

Baur v. Veneman, 352 F.3d 625, 632 (2d Cir. 2003). "At the pleading stage, general factual

allegations of injury resulting from the defendant's conduct may suffice, for on a motion to

dismiss [it is] presum[ed] that general allegations embrace those specific facts that are necessary to support the claim." Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992) (internal

quotation marks omitted). Nonetheless, the injury must be "actual" or "imminent," rather than

"conjectural" or "hypothetical." *Id.* at 560 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Korsinsky's primary claim, that global warming and carbon dioxide emissions may cause him a future injury, is too speculative to establish standing. See Jaghory v. N.Y. State Dep't of

Educ., 131 F.3d 326, 330 (2d Cir. 1997) ("The keystone for determining injury in fact is the requirement that it be distinct and palpable . . . . ") (internal quotation marks omitted). Korsinsky

does not explain exactly what injury may be caused by the appellees' actions, nor does he

1	explain now the appenees actions have increased any possible risk to his hearth. Moreover,		
2	Korsinsky has failed to sufficiently allege that his injury is likely to be redressed by any relief the		
3	district court could grant.		
4	For these reasons, the judgment of the district court is hereby AFFIRMED. The mandate		
5	shall issue forthwith.		
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8	FOR THE COURT:		
9	Roseann B. MacKechnie, Clerk		
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12	By:		